What type of insurgency is al qaeda

DTIC has over 3. Click HERE to register or log in. Report Date: Pagination or Media Count: Despite the lack of consensus in academe and government on what constitutes terrorism, conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is a classic transnational terrorist organization.

Recently, however, some scholars have challenged that verdict, arguing instead that al-Qaeda denotes the emergence of a global Islamic insurgency. The statement also announced the formation of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders," which consisted of a tacit alliance between Bin Laden, his supporters, and a number of regional Islamic militant groups. Following Al Qaeda's bombings of the U. Cole in Yemen , Bin Laden refused to take direct responsibility for the attacks, but claimed that he approved of the strikes and shared the motivations of the individuals who had carried them out.

Bin Laden argued that the bombings should be seen by Americans and the world as retribution for U. Osama Bin Laden's longstanding threats to strike the United States came to fruition on September 11, , and Bin Laden and others subsequently issued several statements confirming Al Qaeda's responsibility for the attacks on New York and Washington.

Following an established pattern, Bin Laden acknowledged his support for the hijackers and repeated his claim that strikes on American targets should be viewed by Muslims and Americans as a defensively motivated response to perceived American aggression in the Islamic world. Statements attributed to Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri since have promised further attacks and sought to justify Al Qaeda's targeting of American and British civilians by arguing that Western societies are morally corrupt, recent democratic reform and human rights initiatives are insincere or bankrupt, and American and British civilians should be held accountable for the policies of their democratically elected governments in the Middle East that Al Qaeda finds objectionable or unjust.

Several Al Qaeda statements have addressed the motives for the Embassy bombings and other terrorist operations, but relatively few statements have been made regarding Al Qaeda's strategic goals in planning and executing the September 11, , attacks on New York and Washington. A text attributed to Al Qaeda military commander Sayf al Adl released in May identifies three primary objectives for the September 11 attacks. Al Adl indicates that in the opinion of Al Qaeda's leadership, this primary objective was "partially achieved," although "other strikes" would have had a greater impact if they had been successful.

However, Al Adl does not identify specific planned attacks that may have been disrupted since September Al Qaeda's second objective, as identified by Al Adl, was to signal and support the "emergence of a new virtuous leadership" dedicated to opposing "the Zionist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant coalition" that Al Qaeda blames for a litany of social and political ills in the Islamic world. Analysts have associated this stated objective with Al Qaeda leaders' views of themselves as the vanguard of a broader global Islamic movement and their desire to inspire political upheaval and change across the Islamic world.

The third and "ultimate objective," according to Al Adl, "was to prompt [the United States] to come out of its hole. Reflecting on the subsequent U. Al Adl and others have conceded that the attacks on New York and Washington were not totally successful, while arguing that the September 11 attack "was enough to prompt the Americans to carry out the anticipated response"—namely direct military action within the Islamic world.

Both Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri have criticized the population and governments of the Islamic world for failing to answer their calls to arms and for cooperating with the United States and its allies.

These criticisms have been coupled with renewed calls for armed "resistance" against the United States and its allies from Al Zawahiri, Al Adl, the late Al Zarqawi, and others. In and , Bin Laden personally addressed the governments and citizens of Europe and the United States directly in an effort to discourage further support for their respective foreign policies in the Islamic world. In April , Bin Laden proposed a "truce" with Europeans if they agreed to abandon their support for the United States and their military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The offer was resoundingly rejected by European leaders and their citizens. In October , on the eve of the U. These sentiments were echoed in tapes issued by Al Zawahiri in , in which he cited Bin Laden's truce offer and characterized Al Qaeda's message to Americans and their allies as "crystal clear.

Let them bear the consequences of their rejection. Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders have cast further doubt on the validity of their truce proposals by simultaneously calling for further attacks on U. The first tape, released on December 16, , received media attention for its praise of an Al Qaeda-affiliated group's attack on the U. Bin Laden appealed directly to "the silent ulema " religious scholars and business and community leaders in Saudi Arabia to withdraw their support for the ruling Al Saud family.

In the second tape, released on December 27, , Bin Laden underscored Al Qaeda's interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency. Bin Laden's January message implied that Al Qaeda operatives had infiltrated the United States and were preparing to strike. In December , Bin Laden identified the conflict in Iraq as "a golden and unique opportunity" for jihadists to engage and defeat the United States, and he characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a "Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation.

On a strategic level, Bin Laden has employed well-known Quranic injunctions against failing to contribute to "the cause of God" to appeal to Muslims to support Al Qaeda and its jihadist affiliates in Iraq politically, financially, and militarily. Subsequent statements attributed to Al Zarqawi and Ayman al Zawahiri have underscored the importance of the conflict in Iraq to the jihadist cause from Al Qaeda's perspective.

Both men vehemently denounced the successful constitutional and electoral processes that have laid the groundwork for the formation of the new Iraqi government: Al Zawahiri has repeatedly argued that the democratic reforms initiated by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan are incomplete and insincere, while Al Zarqawi adopted more sectarian rhetoric in seeking to dissuade Iraq's Sunni community from participating in the country's democratic processes and to condemn Iraq's Shiite political organizations and communities on religious grounds.

On a tactical level, statements from leading Al Qaeda figures have demonstrated a degree of differentiation in their preferred methods for opposing coalition forces in Iraq and the new Iraqi government. Bin Laden has identified "martyrdom operations," or suicide attacks, as "the most important operations" for disrupting the activities of the United States and its allies.

He has applied similar disregard for ethnic, linguistic, and ideological differences in issuing condemnations of so-called collaborators; identifying Arabs cooperating with Iraqi and coalition authorities as equally guilty parties. These differences became public in October after the publication of an intercepted letter reportedly written by Al Zawahiri to Al Zarqawi in which Al Zawahiri offered advice to Al Zarqawi on his campaign in Iraq. Specifically, Al Zawahiri questioned the wisdom of pursuing a campaign against Shiite Iraqis on a sectarian basis when sectarian violence may reduce overall public support among the region's Sunni Muslim population for Al Qaeda's objectives.

Abu Musab al Zarqawi and Al Qaeda military leader Sayf al Adl have referred to the current situation in Iraq as an opportunity for the global jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the heart of the Arab world and to spread into neighboring areas.

Al Adl has speculated that the ongoing violence in Iraq may spread into Syria and Lebanon, which could give "the Islamic action a vast area of action and maneuvering" and help it to attract "tremendous human and financial resources. Al Zarqawi's group claimed responsibility for two terrorist attacks in Jordan as well as a rocket attack launched against Israel from Lebanon in December The Islamic State and its leaders share the strict anti-Shiite sectarian views of Al Zarqawi and routinely refer to Iraqi Shiites in hostile, derogatory terms while launching attacks against Sunni and Shiite government officials and civilians.

In July , Al Baghdadi released an audiotape threatening to launch attacks against Iran unless the Iranian government withdraws its support for Iraqi Shiites. The Islamic State of Iraq's insistence on enforcing their strict interpretations of religious law on Iraqi civilians and targeting members of other insurgent groups, including the religiously oriented Islamic Army of Iraq, has led to fighting that has killed insurgents and Al Qaeda operatives across western and central Iraq in recent months.

Since December , Ayman Al Zawahiri has congratulated Al Baghdadi for the establishment of the so-called Islamic State and has reiterated his plea for fighters in Iraq to overcome their differences in the aftermath of fighting between the Islamic Emirate and other Sunni insurgent groups. The operations of Al Qaeda affiliates continue to be complemented by centrally-planned ideological outreach activities. In a January 30, audiotape, for example, Ayman al Zawahiri identified "three foundations" of Al Qaeda's political ideology and applied them to events in Iraq and elsewhere.

The "three foundations," as outlined by Al Zawahiri are as follows:. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi have applied these and other similar principles to issues of democracy, reform, and conflict in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories.

In both of his December statements, for example, Bin Laden clearly stated his view that democracies, constitutional governments, and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally unacceptable forms of governance for Islamic societies because they empower human rulers and man-made legal systems rather than "the law of God. He also frequently characterized the Iraqi government as illegitimate and collaborationist, echoing to his January post-election statement that his followers in Iraq would "not accept the rule of anyone but that of God and His Prophet [Mohammed].

Bin Laden's December statements urged Muslims to oppose the creation of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories; to resist non-Islamic reform movements in other Islamic societies; and to overturn existing regimes deemed insufficiently-Islamic by Al Qaeda such as the Saudi monarchy.

Al Zawahiri also dismissed Afghan, Egyptian, and Iraqi elections as incomplete and argued that the United States and its allies would not have supported the elections if the results may have yielded Islamist governments that could oppose U.

Elected Islamists also have received criticism for not living up to Al Qaeda leaders' expectations. In December , Al Zawahiri pointedly criticized the Palestinian group Hamas for failing to demand "that Palestine have an Islamic constitution before entering any elections.

Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri have based their calls for revolutionary change in Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of governance where Muslim citizens would empowered to choose and depose their leaders according to Islamic principles and traditions of consultation, or shura.

Al Qaeda military commander Sayf al Adl concluded his May text with advice for Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed strategic framework for the jihadist movement. Elements of similar strategic thinking appeared in statements issued by Al Zawahiri and Al Zarqawi from through A summary follows:. In a July statement, Al Zawahiri outlined "a near-term plan and a long-term plan" for achieving Al Qaeda objectives:.

The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests, as everyone who attacks the Muslim Ummah must pay the price, in our country and theirs, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their interests And the long-term plan is divided into two halves: The first half consists of earnest, diligent work, to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes As for the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, for jihad preparation and training.

Thus, it is a must to hurry to the fields of jihad for two reasons: The first is to defeat the enemies of the Ummah and repel the Zionist Crusade, and the second is for jihadi preparation and training to prepare for the next stage of the jihad.

The "next stage" remains largely undefined in available statements from Al Qaeda leaders, and efforts to define long term goals are likely to prove divisive in light of evident differences in Iraq and other conflict zones over short term strategy and tactics. Variations in the intensity and prominence of Al Qaeda leaders' anti-Israeli rhetoric have fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda's commitment to the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the network's need for support—becoming more pronounced during periods when Al Qaeda's actions have alienated supporters or as part of a more outright ideological appeal.

Bin Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda's cause, which is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived U. To reach the objectives delineated above, it is possible to argue that ISIS has, roughly, two types of main strategies, each of which is related to one of its tasks.

With relation to the territorial consolidation of the caliphate, the strategy used is to build a state while its transnationalization involves other means, among them the terrorist political use of terror. Both the U. Annual Review of Political Science. Taking this path, it seems to us that the events above allowed for ISIS to undertake a war of conquest on the territories and incite a political revolution in the region.

The conquest of a territory the size of the United Kingdom is a more concrete example of this. The second step, however, is understanding which strategies for political stabilization ISIS used. Finally, 'caudillismo' is when the government of a certain country is successively filled by notable figures that can only stabilize it provisionally. In general, totalitarian regimes stabilize themselves by imposing power bargains between classes, parties, ethnicities, etc.

At the same time, they incorporate old structures of power with a new political apparatus, interested above all in a continuous ideological transformation. Such an institutional design has as a goal not only the control of the areas it has seized, but also that of minimizing the impact that the occasional death of one of its leaders could have on the functioning of the organization.

In addition to political bargains with the population for the establishment of a new government structure, another strategy of the foremost importance is the provision of services. ISIS has renovated roads and highways, improvised free community kitchens and looked to guarantee the supply of energy.

These actions are evidence not only of a preoccupation in establishing legitimacy with the populations of the occupied territories, but they also point to efforts to control the territories because, for example, the repair of highways is fundamental for the movement of troops. However, we cannot forget another facet that has made ISIS become known worldwide: the episodes of abuse and violence perpetrated in its territories.

No less revolting are the occurrences of abduction and slavery, targeted primarily against ethnic and religious minorities. These and other examples allow us to state that ISIS's strategy of local control entails the provision of services and the non-terrorist use of terror, that is, that the use of terror is directly linked to the objective of controlling the local population in the present moment. In: Bringing the state back in.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Establish a presence in societies marked by sectarian, tribal, ethnic, and political tensions; Accentuate these divisions by making use of calculated terrorist attacks, creating internal conflicts or even external confrontations between potential adversaries with the purpose of undermining morale and strength; When the military control of territories is possible, extract all resources possible in order to finance additional expansion; Use, in a planned way, propaganda to air an image of strength; Inspire local leaders and other organizations to swear loyalty to the caliphate; Indoctrinate recruits with the apocalyptic world view of ISIS; and Inspire lone-wolf attacks, that is, attacks from individuals who are sympathetic to the cause, even if not necessary directly linked to the organization.

One can see more clearly that it is in this sphere of activity that the terrorist political use of terror is employed. Some of the stages highlighted above, primarily the second, fourth, and seventh, make use of terror to try to transform in the future the correlation of forces on behalf of ISIS.

Like with the case of al-Qaeda, we can also compare ISIS's complexity through the prism of its finances. As opposed to bin Laden's al-Qaeda, which to a large degree depended on donations, there are reports that Baghdadi's organization administers various financial resources, especially stemming from the annexation of production centers and oil fields. Given ISIS's ambitious goals, it needs human resources, particularly soldiers, to carry them out.

The total number of militants is difficult to pin down. Accessed on January 27, Even if we take the more conservative estimate, we are dealing with a number that is far from insignificant. We should also add foreign combatants to these numbers.

Table 02 presents our comparative framework, based on the analysis carried out on this article. From the synthesis it presents, we can weave together considerations about the implications of this comparison. Thumbnail Table 02 Al-Qaeda vs. Through the prism adopted here, such a difference is derived from distinct political objectives, despite the two organizations mirroring the desire to reverse a status quo of the submission of the Muslim world to the West.

As a result, equating both groups as terrorist would be imprecise. ISIS is a more complex organization which ultimately aimed to reconfigure the Levant's borders. Furthermore, with different objectives and logics of action, the two groups have different behaviors.

While al-Qaeda privileges terrorist attacks that are relatively cheap and have the goal of transforming the correlation of forces in the future, ISIS — given its ambition to have a regional foothold — makes non-terrorist use of terror while also, however, incentivizing the terrorist use of terror, above all in Europe. Such a consideration reinforces the arguments against ideas that argue for a direct causality between religion and terrorism. A second consideration is relative to combat.

As we have seen, terrorism is a response to a specific sociopolitical juncture and it is therefore not possible to ignore the influence that foreign interference has had on the formation of both groups. In the case of al-Qaeda, fighting involves fewer strategies of militarization and more investments in understanding what are logistic necessities, such as how to recruit and train militants and how to cut off financing channels.

From a regional point of view, one can argue that the goal of consolidating the caliphate is collapsing, but it would be hasty to argue that the group is definitively finished.

As mentioned before, ISIS has two fronts of combat, and it is the regional one that is under threat now. This brings us to one last point, which is relative to the danger posed by both groups. However, if ISIS continues to lose territory, it would not seem unreasonable to predict that ISIS could also privilege a stance closer to that of al-Qaeda, incentivizing more terrorist attacks on Europe and the U.

Consequently, the comparison set out here incentivizes a certain research agenda even more, such as, for example, the recruitment of militant domestic and foreign and the actions of lone wolves, along with reinforcing the argument that terrorism is not something that has emerged spontaneously from the Middle East. On the contrary, it is intimately linked to the functioning and the contradictions of the contemporary international system.

Abrir menu Brasil. Brazilian Political Science Review. Abrir menu. Political Sci. Table 01 Axes of analysis. Table 02 Al-Qaeda vs. Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. Political Studies Review Vol. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. International Security Vol. Carta Internacional Vol. In: The history of terrorism : from antiquity to Al-Qaeda.

International Politics Vol. Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. In: Critical terrorism studies : a new research agenda. Information Processing and Management Vol. New York: I. Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. Annual Review of Political Science Vol.

International Relations Vol. After more than days of battle, Mosul was retaken by Iraqi forces. On December 19, , the Tunisian Anis Amri drove a truck through a Christmas Market in Berlin, killing at least 12 people and wounding another ISIS claimed authorship of the terrorist attack carried out on December 31, , which killed 39 people and wounded 61 in the Reina nightclub in Istanbul.

Given the purposes of the article, a more detailed history of al-Qaeda is outside our scope. An apostate is a person who renounces a religion, political belief, or principles. The fundamental and canonical sources of Islam are the Qur'an and the Sunnah examples of Muhammad, brought together in collections of records of his words and feats. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jihad is a term with many possible meanings, usually divided between lesser and greater jihad.

According to data assembled by Byman a, p. A detailed historical panorama of ISIS is outside the scope of this article. For this subject, we suggest Stern and Berger This typology presents the additional following ideal types.

Publication Dates Publication in this collection History Received 14 Mar Accepted 15 Oct This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Tables 2. Context of origin: Verify what led to the groups' emergence Objectives: Evaluate what status quo it seeks to alter Methods of action: Analyze the means used to achieve its objectives and their link — direct or indirect — with those objectives.

The next section will analyze al-Qaeda. Afterwards, we will outline ISIS. Establish presence in other societies 2. Accentuate tensions 3. Extract resources 4. Propaganda 5. Attract other leaders 6. Indoctrinate recruits 7. Google Google Scholar. Terror or Terrorism? Analyze the means used to achieve its objectives and their link — direct or indirect — with those objectives.

Medium-term objective: Provision of services and the non-terrorist political use of terror for territorial consolidation.

Final objective: 1.